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Abstract 
 
Contemporary water management practices worldwide are informed by two leading paradigms: integrated water 
resources management and adaptive management. While previous scholarship has already studied the two 
paradigms, as well as their central principles, in isolation, there are few attempts only to theorise their 
interaction and to explore empirically their parallel implementation and co-existence. This article contributes to 
this emerging literature. Its ambition is to review and complement current frameworks conceptualising the 
impact of integrated water resources management on adaptive capacity. To this end, the article analyses the 
involvement of non-state actors in United Kingdom water and flood risk management, specifically in England 
and Wales. This is an exciting case to study: for many decades, environmental management in England and 
Wales had a reputation for being a technocratic exercise. In the past 15 years, however, environmental 
authorities undertook major efforts to lay the foundations for enhanced collaboration and stakeholder 
participation, amongst others encouraged by two European Union initiatives reflecting integrated and adaptive 
management principles: the Water Framework Directive and the Floods Directive. The empirical evidence 
suggests a spurious link only between the two paradigms. This contradicts conventional wisdom which, so I 
argue, tends to oversimplify a complex relationship. I introduce three theory-informed arguments - relating to 
conceptual diversity, path dependency, and the nature of the dependent variable - to address these shortcomings 
and to contribute to theory building. 
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MANUSCRIPT 
 
Integrated and adaptive water resources management: exploring public participation in the United 
Kingdom 
 
Oliver Fritsch 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Contemporary water management practices worldwide are informed by two leading paradigms: integrated water 
resources management (IWRM) and adaptive management. IWRM promotes the integration of all water-related 
management activities, including land and forests, with a view to ensuring water is used in fair, sustainable and 
economically beneficial ways (Global Water Partnership 2011). 
 
Adaptive management, in contrast, advances flexible, learning-oriented and experimental management 
principles so as to enhance the resilience of socio-ecological systems in response to uncertainty and non-linear 
environmental change. The analytical focus of this literature lies on organisations and their abilities to monitor 
current activities, learn from previous experiences, process knowledge and adjust prior decisions (Medema et al. 
2008). This scholarship is tightly linked to the concept of adaptive governance, which goes beyond the 
organisation as unit of analysis and looks at the institutional arrangements enabling adaptive management 
(Folke et al. 2005). The extent to which actors, organisations or socio-ecological systems are able to adapt to 
new challenges is captured by the concept of adaptive capacity (AC); adaptive management and governance 
thereby become constitutive features of AC (Engle 2011). 
 
While extant scholarship has already studied IWRM and adaptive management, as well as their central 
principles, in isolation, there are few attempts only to theorise their interaction and to explore empirically their 
parallel implementation and co-existence. Relying on a case study of water and flood management in England 
and Wales, the article contributes to this emerging literature. 
 
Previous work discusses the linkages between IWRM and AC (or adaptive management), in five ways. First, 
authors compare the two paradigms but make no concluding statement on their compatibility (Ludwig et al. 
2014). Second, IWRM and AC are interpreted as being mutually inclusive; they represent necessary conditions 
IRU HDFK RWKHU¶V HIIHFWLYHQHVV 3DKO-Wostl 2007). Third, the relationship between the two paradigms is 
FKDUDFWHULVHGE\WHQVLRQV LIQRWFRQWUDGLFWLRQV6SHFLILFDOO\,:50¶VWHQGHQF\WRDFKLHYHLQWHJUDWLRQ WKURXJK
institutionalisation stands in contrast to attempts in AC to maintain flexible decision-making and response 
mechanisms (Engle et al. 2011). Fourth, authors may concede that there are tensions yet look out for ways to 
reconcile them (Rouillard et al. 2013). Finally, authors unpack those paradigms and look at the compatibility of 
their constituting principles (Gain et al. 2013). This is the route taken in this article. 
 
Its ambition is to review and complement current frameworks which conceptualise the impact of IWRM on AC. 
I do so with a particular focus on increased flood risk due to climate change. To this end, I analyse the 
involvement of non-state actors in UK water and flood risk management. In the UK, the environment is 
regulated nationally, implying specific authorities, policies and approaches to implementation in England and 
Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland; since 2013 England and Wales have as well been regulated separately. 
This article focuses on England and Wales, an exciting case to study: for many decades, environmental 
management in those parts of Britain had a reputation for being a technocratic exercise. In the past 15 years, 
however, the Environment Agency (EA) undertook major efforts to lay the foundations for enhanced 
collaboration and stakeholder participation, amongst others encouraged by two European Union (EU) initiatives 
reflecting IWRM and AC principles: the Water Framework Directive (WFD) and the Floods Directive (FD). 
The empirical evidence however suggests a spurious link only between the two paradigms, at least in the context 
of England and Wales. This contradicts conventional wisdom which tends to oversimplify, so I argue, a complex 
relationship. I introduce three theory-informed arguments - relating to conceptual diversity, path dependency, 
and the nature of the dependent variable - to address these shortcomings and to contribute to theory building. 
 
The article is organised as follows: the next section discusses theory and concepts and, in doing so, raises three 
objections to previous work analysing the linkage between IWRM and AC. Section 3 analyses the WFD and the 
FD as expressions of IWRM and AC building, respectively, before moving onto section 4, which explores the 
role of public participation in those two policies. Sections 5 presents an in-depth case study of water and floods 
management in England and Wales, and of the role of participation therein, illustrating the relevance of my 
reasoning. Finally, the last section is dedicated to the conclusions. 
 
 
Theory and concepts 
 
The relationship between IWRM and AC has so far rarely been addressed in a systematic fashion. One of the 
most ambitious attempts has been made by Gain et al. (2013). The authors examine key principles of IWRM and 
AC with a view to assessing their potential to mutually reinforce, strengthen and support each other. To this end, 
Gain et al. identify six IWRM principles - integrated management, river basin planning, water policy, public 
participation, demand management, and equity of access - and four principles central to AC, namely flexible 
decision-making arrangements, participatory mechanism, adaptive management cycles, and supply of resources. 
This results in a 6x4 matrix, which describes 24 combinations of factors that may potentially influence each 
other (Table 1 below). The authors then speculate whether those combinations are likely to take the form of 
positive, negative or case-dependent causal relationships; this includes the possibility of no causal connection at 
all. To illustrate, it is suggested that demand management, a cornerstone of IWRM, is positively correlated to 
public participation in the AC discourse; on the other hand, river basin planning, central to IWRM, is negatively 
correlated to flexible decision-making arrangements, key to the AC paradigm. The analysis relies on conceptual 
reasoning and is not supported by empirical data. However, the authors have later tested its applicability in a 
Bangladesh case study (Rouillard et al. 2014). 
 
Linkages between IWRM and 
adaptive capacity           Supply of resources Adaptive cycle 
Flexible decision 
making 
Accessible participatory 
mechanism 
Integrated management ++ 0 í ++ 
River basin management ++ 0 íí + 
Water governance ++ í í ++ 
Multi-stakeholder approach ++ ++ í ++ 
Equity of access ++ 0 0 ++ 
Demand management ++ 0 0 ++ 
 
   Table 1: Linkages between IWRM and adaptive capacity to climate change impacts (Gain et al. 2013) 
 
,QIDLUQHVV*DLQHWDOGRQRWXVHWHUPVVXFKDVµK\SRWKHVLV¶DQGµFDXVDOLW\¶6WLOOWKHWLWOHRIWKHLUSDSHU
undeniably articulates a causal interest, and it is generally difficult not to interpret their analysis as a set of 
hypotheses or, at least, a springboard for theory building. I believe there is much to be learnt from Gain et al. 
However, not all statements made by the authors appear to be intuitively convincing, and some seem to be at 
variance with the empirical data. In the following, I will explain why this is so. To this end, I will present three 
sets of arguments and argue that they are likely to change our reading of the above table and, in doing so, of the 
way we conceptualise the linkages between IWRM and AC. These sets of arguments relate to conceptual 
pluralism in the IWRM and AC literatures, to the temporal dimension, and to the under-theorised nature of the 
dependent variable. 
 
Conceptual pluralism 
 
IWRM is a leading approach in the global discourse on water (Global Water Partnership 2011) and has attracted 
ZLGHVFKRODUO\DWWHQWLRQWRGDWHWKHVHDUFKWHUPVµ,:50¶DQGµLQWHJUDWHGZDWHUUHVRXUFHVPDQDJHPHQW¶UHWXUQ
more than 1,230 finds in the Web of Knowledge. The approach has been described (Kidd and Shaw 2007), 
explained (Fischhendler 2008), evaluated (Fritsch and Benson 2013), and explored in conceptual terms (Grigg 
2014). The overall message this literature, and the wealth of policy documents building on IWRM, sends out is 
one of conceptual pluralism. This refers to its form, substance and ambition. Its form has been described as a 
theory, a concept, a discourse, a paradigm and the like (Giordano and Shah 2014); in terms of substance the 
number of principles associated with IWRM are legion. Furthermore, policy makers as well as scholars disagree 
with regards to the degree of ambition associated with the paradigm. Studying integrated water management in 
Germany, Theesfeld and Schleyer (2013) distinguish light from more ambitious interpretations of IWRM. This 
is certainly a useful way to bring some order out of the chaos. To illustrate their argument, the authors unpack 
WKHSULQFLSOHRIµLQWHJUDWLRQ¶DUJXLQJWKDWGHJUHHVRIDPELWLRQUHODWHWRWKHQXPEHURISROLF\OHYHOVDQGVHFWRUV
being integrated in a management process. The literature on AC shows similar patterns of diversity. Likewise, 
practical applications of IWRM differ across the globe (see, for instance, the special issue 3-4/2013 in the 
International Journal of Water Governance on IWRM applications in various countries). The implication is 
twofold: 
 
First, attempts to explore the extent to which IWRM increases the AC to climate change impacts are challenged 
by the fact that IWRM and AC do not reflect clearly defined, theoretically consistent concepts. They describe 
paradigms crafted in political discourse and practice and are loaded with competing understandings of their 
mission and underlying principles. In fact, it is exactly because of their plurality and open-ended nature that they 
have become so powerful (Grigg 2014). It thus follows that there is not only one IWRM and one AC, making 
any causal analysis a much more complex exercise than suggested by the literature. True, scholars always 
operate in definitional minefields, and one legitimate way out is to take an established understanding, ignore 
alternatives and simply do research (as did Gain et al. 2013); academics need to take decisions at times. 
However, the diversity that exists in terms of ambition - strong vs. weak, light vs. more ambitious 
understandings of IWRM and AC - is less easy to ignore. After all, the distinction between strong and weak 
interpretations enables, if not forces, us to rethink entirely the causal direction of the above hypotheses. I will 
illustrate this argument further below when I talk about path dependency. 
 
Second, if the essence and objectives of the IWRM and AC paradigms are in dispute, then so must be the 
essence and objectives of their underlying principles. For instance, IWRM scholarship - and, for that matter, the 
broader literature on environmental policy and management - is characterised by healthy debates as to what 
integration, participation or equal access to natural resources actually means. Sometimes it is possible to map 
those understandings on a weak-strong scale, but oftentimes things are more complicated. The concept of 
µSXEOLF SDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶ GLIIHUV DFURVV PDQ\ GLPHQVLRQV LQFOXGLQJ WKH µZKR¶ µZKHQ¶ µZK\¶ µKRZ¶ PRGHV RI
decision making within, and degrees of power transferred to, those participatory forums and the like (Arnstein 
1969; Rowe and Frewer 2005). Consequently, any statement on whether IWRM principle a enhances AC 
principle b depends to a large extent on the meaning that we attach to a and b. This is because those components 
describe complex social processes that come, both in the literature and in policy practice, in a variety of forms. 
To illustrate, Newig et al. (2012) identified 250 factors that are supposed to influence the outcomes of public 
participation in environmental decision making, and while we would hope that some of them were discarded as 
XQLPSRUWDQW GXULQJ ILHOGZRUN WKH VKHHU QXPEHU DOUHDG\ VXJJHVWV WKDW µSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶ LV QRW VLPSO\
µSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶,QP\HVWLPDWLRQWKHRQO\XVHIXOZD\WRWKLQNRIWKHOLQNDJHEHWZHHQ,:50DQG AC is to depart 
from oversimplifying statements and ask: Which type of IWRM principle a has an impact on which type of AC 
principle b?  
 
Path dependency 
 
IWRM principles and measures designed to adapt to climate change were and are rarely implemented at the 
same time. Usually, one precedes the other; often countries turned towards IWRM before considering climate 
change policies. This brings in the temporal dimension which is not adequately reflected in previous 
frameworks. The concept of path dependency suggests that existing institutional paths are sticky and resistant to 
change. Authors have proposed different explanations for this phenomenon. Rational-choice theorists refer to 
utilitarian cost-benefit calculations of political actors whereby long-established institutions promise increasing 
returns over time. Power explanations, in contrast, emphasise the stabilising effect of elite group support for 
existing institutional arrangements whereas, third, functional approaches theorise the increasing adaptation of 
subsystems towards system needs. Finally, legitimacy-related explanations maintain that institutions are 
reproduced because actors believe in their appropriateness and justice; beliefs that are in turn reinforced by 
institutions. As diverse as those arguments are: they agree that decisions taken at a point t influence choices 
made at t+1, and that it is usually easier for social actors to maintain the status quo rather than to initiate policy 
change (Thelen 1999; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000; Kay 2005). 
 
I argued in the previous section that the IWRM and AC paradigms may take different forms and are associated 
with more or less ambitious policy goals. Likewise, many underlying components come in variants. According 
to research on path dependency, the variant chosen at a point t, when IWRM was implemented, influences the 
variant chosen at t+1, when climate change policies entered the policy agenda. For the sake of simplicity, let us 
assume that every IWRM and AC principle comes in two variants only, a strong and a weak one. Four scenarios 
are possible: 
 
x Scenario 1: weak IWRM variant  Æ  weak AC variant 
x Scenario 2: strong IWRM variant  Æ  strong AC variant 
x Scenario 3: strong IWRM variant  Æ weak AC variant 
x Scenario 4: weak IWRM variant  Æ strong AC variant 
 
Plausibly, the first three scenarios are more likely to occur than the fourth scenario. Scenarios one and two 
describe situations in which the chosen IWRM variant lays the ground for an equally ambitious AC variant, be it 
strong or weak. Scenario three disFXVVHVDµQRQ-SDWKGHSHQGHQF\¶VHWWLQJLQZKLFKGHSDUWXUHIURPHVWDEOLVKHG
tracks would actually be easier, cheaper, less conflict-prone and perhaps also more popular than staying on 
established tracks - and a shift from strong to weak environmental management principles would be easier, 
cheaper, less conflict-prone and at least in the western world also more popular. Scenario four describes a 
situation in which a weak IWRM variant becomes the motor for a strong AC variant. This is not at all in line 
with what the concept of path dependency would predict. Unfortunately, many countries across the globe have 
implemented IWRM principles in their light version only (see, for instance, Theesfeld and Schleyer 2013), 
suggesting that scenario one is most likely to occur. 
 
I draw two conclusions from this thought experiment: the causal pathways sketched out by Gain et al. (2013) are 
less linear than envisaged; only one out of four scenarios describes a situation in which a strong AC variant is 
likely to be implemented, and its precondition - a strong IWRM variant - is empirically rare. This implies that 
the degree to which IWRM is a strong driver of change towards AC building (symbolised by two + symbols in 
*DLQ¶VIUDPHZRUNLVDWWLPHVZHDNHUWKDQDQWLFLSDWHG,QRWKHr words, weak IWRM variants, so my hypothesis, 
will slow down ambitious AC interpretations and result in weak policies instead. 
 
The dependent variable 
 
Conventional wisdom lack precision as to what exactly the dependent variable is, i.e. what exactly in adaptive 
management, governance or capacity is maximised through IWRM. I suggest that the dependent variable may 
take four different forms: 
 
x Processes: Both the integrated management of water resources and measures taken to adapt to climate 
change impacts are processes. Policy makers communicate with upper and lower decision-making 
levels, liaise across sectors, consult stakeholders and the public, draft guidelines, management plans 
and strategies, secure funds, coordinate management cycles and so forth. The original hypothesis may 
therefore be interpreted such that activities, procedures and routines developed in IWRM contexts 
enhance activities, procedures and routines carried out to enhance AC, i.e. make them quicker and 
smoother, not the least because actors are familiar with them and rely on existing working relationships 
defined by mutual respect and trust.  
 
x Institutions: Management activities do not take place in an institutional vacuum. They rely on 
functioning organisations, decision-making arrangements, legal frameworks and guidelines, but also 
training and funding. In this sense, we may rephrase the original hypothesis such that well-functioning 
institutions in the water sector enhance the establishment and operation of institutions in the field of 
climate. 
 
x Effectiveness: IWRM and AC are no ends in themselves, they serve to achieve specific water- and 
climate-related policy goals, in the context of this article: improved water quality and protection from 
flood risk. We may reinterpret the original hypothesis from a policy effectiveness perspective and 
explore whether the achievement of IWRM objectives facilitates the accomplishment of AC goals. 
 
x Efficiency: Management activities bind scarce resources, and there is a general interest in achieving 
IWRM and climate-related policy objectives in a cost-effective way. From this perspective, the original 
hypothesis would take the following articulation: the more efficient we are in achieving IWRM 
objectives, the more efficient we will be in our attempts to adapt to climate change impacts.  
 
Obviously, those dependent variables may not only be used to conceptualise the linkage between IWRM and 
AC, but also between individual IWRM and AC principles. For example, scholars may want to explore whether 
institutions created to enable river basin planning support the establishment of institutions that enable the 
participation of non-state actors in an AC context. 
 
The nature of the dependent variable has direct implications for hypothesis building. This is because the above 
causal relationships are by no means linear. They rely on a large number of intervening variables, and those 
intervening variables vary, depending on whether we think in terms of processes, institutions, effectiveness or 
efficiency. Consequently, the validity of any causal claim hinges on the way the dependent variable is 
conceptualised. Even if it could be shown that key processes related to IWRM principle a improve processes of 
AC principle b, it does not automatically follow that the establishment of institutions will also be smoother or 
that policy objectives will be achieved more effectively and efficiently. This is, again, because the relationship 
between institutions, processes and outcome variables is not linear (Newig and Fritsch 2009). 
 
To sum up, this section discussed three arguments that add to our understanding of the linkages between IWRM 
and AC: conceptual pluralism, path dependency, and the dependent variable. In the following I will illustrate 
their relevance using a UK case study and the example of public participation, a principle which pertains to both 
the IWRM and the AC paradigms. 
 
 
Water and flood management in Europe 
 
IWRM and AC are based on principles that provide guidance to policy makers and stakeholders. Consequently, 
scholars studying whether and how IWRM enhances AC are confronted with a variety of potential causal 
relationships between those principles. Qualitative researchers are unable to explore all of them in-depth in one 
journal article. What is more, the picture is likely to look even more complex if we took into consideration 
conceptual plurality, the temporal dimension and diversity of the dependent variable. I therefore examine one 
principle in detail, public participation, which takes a central place in IWRM and the AC discourse. To this end, 
, VWXG\SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI WKH:)'DQG WKH)'0HWKRGRORJLFDOO\ WKLV LVD µPRVW-OLNHO\¶
case (Gerring 2007); if IWRM does not enhance AC here we need to rethink the linkages between the two 
paradigms anyway. 
 
The WFD, adopted in 2000, is plausibly the most ambitious piece of EU legislation in the field of water. The 
Directive defines a general framework for integrated river basin management in Europe with a view to 
DFKLHYLQJ µJRRG ZDWHU VWDWXV¶ E\  LQ DOO (U member states. Institutional novelties include IWRM key 
principles such as river basin planning, public participation and integrated management. The WFD deals with 
water quality problems and largely ignores challenges related to water quantity and access, which is why the 
Directive only partially embodies IWRM principles in Europe (Fritsch and Benson 2013).  
 
The FD was adopted in 2007. The Directive requires EU member states to assess and map areas at risk from 
flooding and to prepare flood risk management plans in response to risks identified. To this end, it relies on a 
three-step procedure: a preliminary assessment of flood risks, the production of flood hazard and risk maps, and 
the preparation of Flood Risk Management Plans. The Directive reflects key principles of the adaptive capacity 
discourse, including public participation and adaptive cycles. Obviously, the FD tackles one specific climate 
change impact, flooding. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the Directive represents a prime example of 
legislation designed to strengthen the AC of communities in Europe. 
 
So far, the link between the two directives remains understudied. Blackstock et al. (2009) as well as Larsen 
(2011) report that environmental managers and stakeholders support the integration of climate change concerns 
into river basin planning yet prioritise short-term objectives related to WFD implementation. Newig et al. (2014) 
compare the role of public participation in the two directives, based on legal reasoning and text analysis, and 
present first findings of empirical research on participatory flood management in Germany. Earle et al. (2011), 
ILQDOO\DUJXHVWKDWWKHWZRGLUHFWLYHVDLPWRPDQDJHWKHVDPHZDWHUERGLHVZLWK³FRPSHWLQJSROLF\REMHFWLYHV
SXWXSRQWKHP´SZKLFKLVOLkely to result in negative policy outcomes. 
 
 
Public participation in water and floods management in Europe 
 
The WFD and the FD are amongst the first EU policies to rely on mandated participatory planning (Newig and 
Koontz 2013). Participation in this context involves three components: information, consultation, and active 
involvement. Information requirements mainly include obligations to make status and risk assessments, 
background information, and maps publicly available (Art. 14(1) WFD and 10(1) FD). In terms of consultation, 
member states must organise three rounds of public comment during the preparation of river basin management 
plans (RBMP) (Art. 14(2) WFD). The FD, in contrast, does not envisage consultations although respective 
opportunities exist in flood risk management, regulated by the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive. 
 
$FWLYH LQYROYHPHQWGHVFULEHVDPRUH LQWHQVHPRGHRISDUWLFLSDWLRQ$UW:)'VWLSXODWHV WKDW³0HPEHU
States shall encourage the active involvement of all interested parties in the implementation of this Directive, in 
SDUWLFXODU LQ WKH SURGXFWLRQ UHYLHZ DQG XSGDWLQJ RI WKH ULYHU EDVLQ PDQDJHPHQW SODQV´ VLPLODUO\ $UW 
FD). This includes planning face-to-face and in small groups and departs from the one-way communication that 
FKDUDFWHULVHV LQIRUPDWLRQ DQG FRQVXOWDWLRQ +RZHYHU WKH SKUDVH µVKDOO HQFRXUDJH¶ ZHDNHQV WKH OHJDO
ELQGLQJQHVVRIWKHSURYLVLRQDQGOHJDOH[SHUWVKROGWKDW³WKHREOLJDWLRQWRHQFRXUDJHLQYROYHPHQWIDOOVVKRUWRI
a duty to ensure that thLV DFWXDOO\ RFFXUV´ +RZDUWK  S 7KLV DUWLFOH PDLQO\ IRFXVHV RQ WKH DFWLYH
involvement provisions in the two directives. They vary, despite apparent similarities, along three dimensions: 
function, actors, and scale. 
 
On the one hand, participation takes very different functions in European water and flood risk management. The 
:)'DQG LWVJXLGDQFHGRFXPHQWVFRQFHLYHRISDUWLFLSDWLRQDVD WRRO WR LPSURYHSROLF\HIIHFWLYHQHVV³SXEOLF
participation is not an end in itself but a tool to achieve the environmental objectives of the Water Framework 
'LUHFWLYH´ (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ  SYL 7KUHH PHFKDQLVPV FDQ EH GLVWLQJXLVKHG ILUVW SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LV
VXSSRVHGWRHQKDQFHWKHNQRZOHGJHEDVHRIGHFLVLRQPDNHUV,QYROYHPHQWSURFHGXUHVVHUYHWR³>F@ROOHFWGDta, 
LQIRUPDWLRQ DQG YLHZVRI D UDQJHRI VWDNHKROGHUV´ WKH LQSXWVRI ZKLFK KHOS WR ³GHWHUPLQH WKHSUHVVXUHV DQG
LPSDFWV RQ ZDWHU ERGLHV´ DQG WR ³VHW XS D WUHQG VFHQDULR ZKLFK SUHGLFWV WKH VRFLR-economic trends for the 
IXWXUH´LELGS6HFRQGSDUWLFLSation helps bring in previously neglected political viewpoints (ibid., p26). 
7KLUGSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQFUHDVHVDFFHSWDQFHUDWHVZLWKSXEOLFGHFLVLRQV³5%03VDUHOLNHO\WREHPRUHVXFFHVVIXO
WKURXJKDFKLHYHPHQWRI µEX\-LQ¶ WR WKHLUREMHFWLYHVDQGGHOLYHU\E\ SURPRWLQJ µRZQHUVKLS¶ DFFHSWDELOLW\DQG
WKHFRRSHUDWLRQRIUHOHYDQWVWDNHKROGHUV´LELGS7KH)'LQFRQWUDVWGRHVQRWSURPRWHDPDWHULDOSROLF\
goal; participatory flood risk planning is the goal, no matter whether the measures taken actually support 
adaptation to flood risk. To be clear, the instrumental approach is justifiable under reference to the demanding 
and legally binding 2015 WFD water quality goals. However, it comes with a caveat: it is exactly the distinction 
EHWZHHQµEHLQJ LQVWUXPHQWDO IRUDJRDO¶DQG µEHLQJDJRDO¶ WKDWPDUNV WKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQFORVHGVWUHDP-
lined, weak forms of involvement and open, open-ended, strong participation. It shapes non-state actor 
involvement throughout the life cycle of a decision-making process, from process mandate to participant 
selection, process design, communication, decision-making modes and many others.  
 
2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHWZRGLUHFWLYHVVSHDNWRGLIIHUHQWDXGLHQFHV7KH:)'JXLGHOLQHH[SODLQVWKDWWKH³PRVW
LPSRUWDQWVWDNHKROGHUV«ZLOO be those who can really contribute to delivering solutions (e.g. other government 
ERGLHVZDWHUFRPSDQLHVZDVWHZDWHUWUHDWPHQWFRPSDQLHV´RU³WKRVHZKRKDYHWHFKQLFDOH[SHUWLVH´(XURSHDQ
Commission 2003, p29). This illustrates how instrumental rationales influence participant selection and the 
overall format of involvement, limiting participation to those who are able to help deliver the 2015 water quality 
goals. The spectrum of participants is much broader in a flood risk context. This is because the Directive 
³FRQVLGHUVDODUJHUUDQJHRIµJRRGV¶WREHSURWHFWHGHQYLURQPHQWKXPDQKHDOWKFXOWXUDOKHULWDJHDQGHFRQRP\´
DQGWKHUHIRUH³JHQHUDWHVDYDULHW\RIDIIHFWHGVWDNHKROGHUV´1HZLJHWDOS,PSRUWDQWO\DXWKRULWLHV
have little reason to streamline the process and to be selective about actors and their viewpoints. The FD does 
QRW DIWHU DOO SURPRWH D PDWHULDO SROLF\ JRDO WKDW QHHGV WR EH µSURWHFWHG¶ IURP SDUWLFLSDQWV LW LV µSURFHGXUHV
RQO\¶ DQG GXH WR LWV RSHQ HQGHGQHVV PXFK PRUH DPEitious and reflexive than instrumental notions of 
involvement. 
 
Finally, those actors operate at different scales. The WFD refers to river basin districts and catchments whereas 
flood risk is usually managed at community level. Art. 9 FD suggests coordinating the two processes at a 
strategic policy level, but EU guidelines provide little help as to how this could be achieved (European 
Commission 2009). 
 
It thus follow that, due to the linkage of involvement to a previously defined policy goal, the WFD represents an 
instrumental and therefore weak approach towards participation. The FD, in contrast, promotes a more open 
format of involvement, compatible with strong notions of AM. 
 
 
Public participation in water and floods management in the UK 
 
The UK environment is regulated nationally, which implies specific authorities for England, Wales, Scotland, 
and Northern Ireland. I have studied one English river basin district, the Humber, in detail and the other nine 
basins in England and Wales, until 2013 regulated jointly, on a more general level. This includes researching 
flood risk areas within the Humber basin. I thereby disregarded Northern Ireland and Scotland. I conducted 
more than 40 semi-structured interviews with public officials involved in organising public participation, 
stakeholders in participatory forums, stakeholders not represented in participatory panels, and policy makers 
involved in implementing the two EU directives in the UK. Further, I consulted legal acts, implementation 
guidelines, action plans, and strategy papers. In order to ensure that my findings were representative, I 
interviewed lead officials in areas other than the Humber as well. 
 Participation in WFD water management 
 
The WFD was transposed into English and Welsh law through the Water Environment Regulations of 2003 
(Water Framework Directive) (England and Wales). According to Art. 10 (2ai), it is the discretion of the 
FRPSHWHQWDXWKRULW\WRGHFLGHZKHWKHULWSURYLGHV³RSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUWKHJHQHUDOSXEOLFDQGWKRVHSHUVRQVOLNHO\
to be interested in or affected by its proposals to participate in discussion and the exchange of information or 
YLHZVLQUHODWLRQWRWKHSUHSDUDWLRQRIWKRVHSURSRVDOV´$FWLYHLQYROYHPHQWLQ(QJODQGDQG:DOHVLVWKHUHIRUH
not a legal requirement set by the British legislator, but a voluntary decision made by the EA. 
 
The agency operates from eight regional offices. Two of the regional offices manage two river basins. The EA 
has sole responsibility for managing nine river basin districts and two jointly with the Scottish authorities. 
Regional water authorities other than the EA regulate river basins in Gibraltar, Northern Ireland, and Scotland.  
 
Non-state actor involvement takes place in so-called Liaison Panels. Operating at the river basin district level, 
/LDLVRQ3DQHOVGLVFXVVWKHFRQWHQWRI5%03VDVZHOODVWKHPHDVXUHVQHHGHGWRDFKLHYHWKHSODQ¶VREMHFWLYHV
Furthermore, Liaison Panels are involved in the monitoring and enforcement of all management activities. 
Although the panels are exposed to a number of political expectations and demands, legal responsibility lies 
solely with the EA. In this sense, all Liaison Panels are purely advisory (Department for Environment Food and 
Rural Affairs 2006, p40). In order to ensure that Liaison panels interpreted their mandate such that it was 
compatible with the 2015 WFD water quality goals, regional EA offices operated with templates developed by 
WKH($¶VKHDGRIILFH 
 
This includes, first, a list of statutory governmental bodies and organised interests which were to be approached 
for membership of the Liaison Panels. Although there were always one or two seats to be allocated based on 
regional considerations, 90 per cent of all seats were reserved for specific sectors. For instance, in the Humber 
basin (general picture confirmed by managers of the other river basins), British Waterways, Natural England, 
Associated British Ports, and delegates from local and regional decision-making bodies were involved. 
Stakeholders came from four sectors: business, agriculture, the water industry, and NGOs dedicated to the 
protection of nature.  
 
This involves, second, templates for the three consultation rounds and the draft RBMPs. These templates 
considerably restricted ambitions developed at the regional level and the measures envisaged to achieve specific 
objectives. EA river basin managers justify this procedure with reference to saving resources and, more 
importantly, to ensuring consistency across all river basins in England and Wales. Stakeholders, in contrast, 
expresseGFRQFHUQDERXWWKHGHJUHHVRISRZHUGHOHJDWHGWRWKH/LDLVRQ3DQHODQGIRXQGWKDW³WKHQDWLRQDOWHDP
LQ WKH (QYLURQPHQW $JHQF\ DUH GLFWDWLQJ WKH UHJLRQDO WHDP´ &RQVHTXHQWO\ WKH ³VLOO\ DQQR\LQJ´ QDWLRQDO
template frustrated many stakeholders in their efIRUWVWRFRQWULEXWHVXEVWDQWLYHO\WRWKHSDQHO³<RUNVKLUH:DWHU
and colleagues in other regions got on okay with the regional Environment Agency colleagues and managed to 
arrange things eventually and everything. EA got away, talked to their national people, come back and say: No, 
QDWLRQDOSHRSOHGLGQRWRND\6RWKDW¶VPDGHLWTXLWHDZNZDUG´ 
 
Finally, the organisers of the panels seemed to restrict discussions about political goals. Instead, the panel 
focused entirely on measures to achieve the goals that the EA had identified beforehand. Accordingly, the EA 
structured Liaison Panel meetings in a way that reflected the technical challenges of WFD implementation. 
While EA staff deny one-sidedness and claim that there was scope for discussions about procedures and 
objectives, Humber panel members tend to disagree. In particular, stakeholders with a more general profile, e.g. 
those representing local communities or regional assemblies, experienced major problems in following panel 
discussions. In their view, WKLVXQGHUPLQHGWKHLUDELOLW\WRUHSUHVHQWWKHLUFRQVWLWXHQF\HIIHFWLYHO\³,WZDVYHU\
technical and  difficult for people, unless they are specialists. I found it quite difficult to understand sometimes 
what actually was going on at the panel meeting, what was actually being discussed, what the implications 
ZRXOGEH´ 
 
Top-GRZQ IUDPLQJ WKURXJK WKH ($¶V KHDG RIILFH DQG D WHFKQRFUDWLF ZD\ RI KDQGOLQJ WKH SDQHOV UHVXOWHG LQ
disappointment among stakeholders and a lack of ownership for the final RBMPs. In the Humber basin, 
VWDNHKROGHUV FRPPHQWV UDQJHG IURP ³ZRUWKZKLOH³ DQG ³UHDVRQDEO\ SOHDVHG ZLWK LW³ WR MXGJPHQWV ZKLFK
VXJJHVWHGWKDWSDQHOPHPEHUVIRXQG³WKHZKROHSURFHVVGLIILFXOWWRXQGHUVWDQG´³VOLJKWO\IUXVWUDWLQJ´DQG³RI
QRWPXFKXVH³,QSDUWLFXODUJUHHQDFWRUVWDNHWKHYLHZWKDWWKH\KDYHEHHQ³KLMDFNHG´E\WKH($DQGH[SRVHG
WRDSURFHVVRI³DFFHSWDQFHPDQDJHPHQW´ 
 
Apart from forums at the river basin district level, the EA used a number of other formats to interact with 
stakeholders at the regional or sub-basin level, including catchment-based forums, thematic forums, and 
workshops to facilitate enhanced dialogue between the EA and academia. Furthermore, the National Liaison 
Panel for England, the WFD Wales Stakeholder Group established at the Welsh Assembly, and the National 
Stakeholder Forum for England provide strategic overviews on operations in Anglo-Welsh river basin districts 
at national level. Interviews with participants suggest that these meetings were mainly held to provide 
information from state to non-state actors and statutory regulators. 
 
In sum, through the establishment of Liaison Panels at the river basin district and national levels, the EA 
engages directly with regulatees and other statutory organisations in order to discuss matters of concern that 
arise during the implementation of the Directive. However, the critical observations above testify that the hopes 
of those advocating stronger forms of participation have certainly not been fulfilled as of yet.  
 
Explaining modes of participation in WFD implementation 
 
In order to understand this pattern, we have to travel back in time. For many decades, secretive relations 
between inspectors and polluters were a key characteristic of British environmental policy and management 
(Rhodes 1981; Jordan and Richardson 1982; Moran 2003). Cooperation mainly followed functional imperatives 
as inspectors required additional information from polluters that they were unable to collect themselves due to 
low staff numbers. Further, transgressions were extremely difficult to prove so that informal negotiation was the 
most effective way to trigger behavioural change. Not surprisingly, this approach provided little scope for 
FROODERUDWLYH OHDUQLQJ DQG GHOLEHUDWLRQ ³%ULWLVK SROOXWLRQ FRQWURO SROLF\ LV basically made and enforced in 
SULYDWH´DQG ³SUHFOXGHVRSSRUWXQLW\ IRUHIIHFWLYHSDUWLFLSDWLRQE\RWKHUSROLWLFDOFRQVWLWXHQFLHV´ 9RJHO
p91-92). 
 
This style came under fire during the Thatcherite reforms, which emphasised the privatisation of public services, 
the introduction of market mechanisms in the public sector, and the creation of more or less independent 
regulatory agencies (Parker and Sewell 1988; Pitkethly 1990; Maloney and Richardson 1994). Regulatory 
agencies supervise, regulate, and monitor policy sectors that are characterised by a high degree of specialisation. 
Agency operations, therefore, require expert knowledge and technical skills that elected politicians or 
bureaucratic generalists rarely possess. Consequently, the legitimacy of agency decisions rely less on democratic 
elections and competence delegation, and more on expert judgments made independently from political 
concerns and interest groups. Unlike similar developments in the US, endeavours to formalise the relationship 
between regulators and regulatees were not paralleled by public involvement programmes in order to 
compensate for the loss of democratic legitimacy (Moran 2003). Supported by domestic and European 
legislation such as the 1990 Environmental Protection Act and the 1999 Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 
the EA and other regulatory agencies saw a window of opportunity to develop a more adversarial style towards 
regulatees, to enforce environmental rules more thoroughly and, despite industry-friendly rulings, to take 
polluters to the courts in cases of non-compliance (McMahon 2006, p131).  
 
Environmental regulators, as a result, showed little commitment to participation in water management. Instead, 
these agencies put a high premium on the technical and scientific expertise within their organisations. This did 
not prevent the EA and its predecessors from engaging in a number of participatory exercises, for instance, 
during the preparation of Local Environment Agency Plans, Flood Alleviation Schemes, Catchment 
Management Plans and through various advisory committees. However, only a few of these opportunities for 
involvement went beyond uncommitted note-and-comment procedures, while none of them were applied 
consistently across the country, and only the above-mentioned advisory committees were based on statutory 
obligations (Tunstall and Green 2003, p39-54). 
 
Since the election victory of New Labour in 1997, participation and network governance have become mantras 
that have further developed the regulatory changes which started in the late 1980s (Bevir and O'Brien 2001; 
Page 2003). While certainly none of these efforts marked a revolutionary turn towards participatory democracy, 
1HZ /DERXU¶V DJHQGD KDG D SURIRXQG LPSDFW RQ WKH SROLWLFDO ODQGVFDSH LQ %ULWDLQ DQG SXW WKH EA under 
considerable pressure from governmental bodies and non-state actors. These organisations were consultees in 
various contexts and became potential stakeholders of the EA. As a result, the more participatory modes of 
governance reflected the societaO PDLQVWUHDP WKH OHVV FRPSDWLEOH WKH\ ZHUH ZLWK WKH ($¶V WHFKQRFUDWLF
regulatory style, which became the subject of an investigation by the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution in 1998 and two House of Commons Select Committees in 2000 and 2003. The findings of all three 
reviews were remarkably negative.  
 
The report which was published by the Royal Commission analysed the ethos and practices of British inspectors 
and concluded that environmental decision-making was a closed process in Britain. The report suggested that 
the values of citizens, rather than of standard setters and scientists, should guide the definition and analysis of 
SUREOHPVDVZHOODVWKHGHYHORSPHQWRISROLF\SURSRVDOV:HDOH:KLOHWKH5R\DO&RPPLVVLRQ¶VVWXG\
was an attack from a body of academic experts, the two reports published by the House of Commons Select 
Committee in 2000 and 2003 came from the centre of political life in Britain. Based on evidence which reflected 
the day-to-day experiences of stakeholders, EA staff, and regulatees, the Select Committee revealed that agency 
operations suffered from a legitimacy deficit. This was not the least because the EA showed great reluctance 
when it came to including stakeholders in environmental planning. To be sure, this is not exactly surprising. The 
DJHQF\¶VUHJXODWRU\VW\OHZDVDIWHUDOODFRQVHTXHQFHRI WKHIXQFWLRQZKLFK LWDQGPDQ\RWKHUVFLHQFH-based 
UHJXODWRUV LQ WKH 8. KDG EHHQ JLYHQ 0DQ\ VWDNHKROGHUV KRZHYHU KDYH FRPH WR EHOLHYH WKDW WKH DJHQF\¶V
managerial approach has caused a serious legitimacy deficit. The challenge for the EA was to process these 
insights. 
 
$W WKH VDPH WLPH WKRVH LQYHVWLJDWLRQV VKHGVHULRXVGRXEWVRQ WKH($¶VDELOLW\ WR VXFFHVVIXOO\ LPSOHPHQW WKH
WFD. During the inquiry, stakeholders and experts pointed out that, in order to achieve the ecological goals of 
the WFD, the EA was required to collaborate with a plurality of statutory authorities involved in land use 
planning, development planning, and pollution control, and to exert influence on a number of policy fields 
RXWVLGH WKH($¶V DUHDRI FRPSHWHQFH +RXVHRI&RPPRQV ,WHP7XQVWDOO 	 *UHHQ S-24) 
map the degree of cooperation required between the EA and other statutory or private actors. The authors list 26 
activities related to water planning that the EA has to undertake or supervise during the implementation of the 
Directive. The overview suggests that, under the current legal and administrative framework, the EA neither 
possesses the political, technical, and organisational competences to regulate all the activities, nor is in control 
of all funds necessary for their implementation, thereby suggesting that the EA was ill-prepared for the 
coordinative and communicative tasks set by the WFD. The Select Committee found that iQSDUWLFXODUWKH($¶V
working relationship with agriculture was unlikely to resolve problems related to non-point source pollution, 
ZKLFK ZRXOG PDNH WKH DFKLHYHPHQW RI WKH :)'¶V  JRDOV XQOLNHO\ ,Q RUGHU WR LPSOHPHQW ³ZKROHVDOH
changes in such practiceV´ +RXVH RI &RPPRQV  ,WHP  WKH ($ ZRXOG QHHG WR GHYHORS IRUPDWV RI
FROODERUDWLRQ LQFRPSDWLEOH ZLWK DJHQF\¶V FXUUHQW DSSURDFK ,Q WKHLU UHVSRQVH WKH ($¶V &KLHI ([HFXWLYH
DFNQRZOHGJHGWKHFKDOOHQJHVDKHDGH[SODLQLQJWKDW³ZHDUHQRWFRPSODFHQW:H are a bit like swans, we may 
ORRNYHU\VHUHQHRQWKHVXUIDFHEXWZHDUHSDGGOLQJOLNHKHOOXQGHUQHDWKWKHZDWHU´LELG2UDO(YLGHQFH
As a consequence, the EA engaged in a collective learning process, facilitated by external consultants, resulting 
LQDµ)UDPHZRUNIRU6WDNHKROGHU5HODWLRQV¶ZKLFKODLGWKHIRXQGDWLRQIRU/LDLVRQ3DQHOV\VWHPGLVFXVVHGDERYH 
 
To summarise, two factors caused the EA to rethink their approach to regulation: societal and political pressure, 
and the insight that the WFD SRVHG FKDOOHQJHV WKDW UHTXLUHGRUJDQLVDWLRQ UHIRUP+RZHYHU QHLWKHU WKH($¶V
self-perception nor the streamlined approach towards participation in the WFD encouraged the agency to go 
beyond weak forms of involvement. 
 
Participation in FD flood risk management 
 
A salient issue for decades, flood risk entered the UK policy agenda again in 2007 when floods destroyed 
thousands of homes and caused significant economic damage. In a government report (Cabinet Office 2008), Sir 
Michael Pitt identified institutional complexity and fragmentation as key factors explaining the poor 
performance in UK flood management, suggesting to simplify and unify responsibilities and, where various 
authorities are involved, calling for better collaboration between local, regional and national actors 
(Recommendations 15 and 17). These recommendations were implemented through the 2010 Flood and Water 
Management Act. However, those developments coincided with the adoption of the FD at the EU level, 
implemented in the UK through the 2009 Flood Risk Regulations. 
 
Formally, responsibility for flood risk lies with the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. In 
practice, however, key decisions are made and implemented by the EA, together with unitary and county 
councils, i.e. municipalities, and independent drainage boards (Johnson and Priest 2008). Active involvement 
tools are deployed at the local level and include private water companies, developers, British Waterways, the 
Highway Authority, Regional Flood and Coastal Committees, green NGOs and civic associations more broadly, 
National Rail and charities of all kinds (Nye et al. 2011). 
 
In a nutshell, participation in English flood risk management follows patterns similar to participation in WFD 
water planning: Interviews suggest, first, that the EA dominates the planning process and steers decision making 
in desired directions; second, that face-to-face meetings, if they occur, leave little scope for deliberation and 
open-ended discussions; and, third, that the information provided is insufficient and often too technical, thereby 
excluding non-experts from debates. This is in line with findings of Porter and Demeritt (2012, p2365 and 2375) 
ZKRVKRZKRZIORRGPDSVSURYLGHGE\WKH($VHUYHGWR³VWDQGDUGL]HWKHSURFHVV´DQGWR³VFULpt the behaviour 
RI LWV XVHUV´ ZLWK D YLHZ WR ³HQVXUH WKDW SODQQLQJ GHFLVLRQV ZHUH DOLJQHG ZLWK ($ YLHZV DERXW DYRLGLQJ
GHYHORSPHQWLQ]RQHVDWULVNRIIORRGLQJZLWKRXWDFWXDOO\EDQQLQJVXFKGHYHORSPHQWRXWULJKW´ 
 
At first sight, this may come as a surprise: on the one hand, the EA was not under pressure to achieve a 
previously defined policy goal, as was the case in WFD water planning. More specifically, because participation 
was supposed to be an end in itself, there was no functional reason to instrumentalise participation in some way 
or another. Yet this underestimates the pressure under which the EA (and local authorities) operate since the 
2007 floods, the Pitt Report and the harsh criticisms they received from policy makers and the media. More 
importantly, the observed patterns are simply a continuation of deeply ingrained modes of operation, typical for 
an authority which likes to maintain the image of a rational, scientific and technical regulator rather than that of 
a communicator and facilitator (McMahon 2006). True, the EA has made significant moves from non-
communication to streamlined participation when it began to implement the WFD, but without significant 
functional or political pressure there is no reason to expect the EA to abandon its top-down approach and to 
open up towards more advanced forms of involvement ± this is exactly where path dependency kicks in. 
 
Whether more recent developments will be able to challenge path dependency is an open question. In the last 
few years, the UK began to promote a catchment-based approach to water management with a view to better 
tackling issues related to water abstraction, diffuse pollution, and artifical water bodies (Department for 
Environment Food and Rural Affairs 2013). It relies on existing catchment partnerships, but also promotes 
collaboration where such partnerships do not yet exist. The catchment-based approach takes management 
activities to a lower policy level, and there is little reason to assume that this would make the EA change their 
overall attitude towards participation. After all, we do not observe any fundamental difference in the degree and 
quality of participation in Liaison Panels at national and river basin district level (Benson et al. 2014). However, 
given that catchment management in England often builds on existing catchment partnerships, one might argue 
that this would somewhat loosen the grip of the EA on collaborative processes and provide more agency to non-
state actors at local and catchment level. However, the empirical evidence so far is scarce, and existing works 
tend to confirm the importance of path-dependency (Cook et al. 2012; Short 2015). 
 
In sum, the evidence shows that public participation may come in different variants in IWRM and AM, variants 
that may reflect opposite poles on a weak-strong scale and that question the one-dimensional view taken in 
current frameworks. Because participation may describe very diverse modes of involvement, decision-making 
rules and ambitions, participation may also have varying social, political and ecological effects. This insight 
obviously challenges binary causal statements made in previous work. Second, the case study highlights the 
importance of the temporal dimension. The EA, as a regulator with a scientific identify, elected to implement 
WKH:)'¶VSXEOLFSDUWLFLSDWLRQSURYLVLRQVLQDGLVWLQFWZD\DQGGXHWRSDWKGHSHQGHQF\IROORZHGWKLVWUDFND
couple of years later in flood risk management, although this approach was clearly at odds with the ambitions of 
the FD. This case study illustrates, finally, the importance of a carefully constructed dependent variable. This is 
because the causal connection between IWRM and AM may be interpreted in very different ways, depending on 
whether we think in terms of institutions, processes, or effectiveness and efficiency. The case of the UK 
suggests a moderate positive effect with regards to institution-building. However, it is not very apparent that this 
affected processes, not the least because they occurred at different geographical scales and included different 
stakeholder groups. It is too early to assess policy effectiveness and efficiency, but given that participation had 
very different functions in the two processes there is little reason to assume that we will be able to observe 
mutual reinforcement in the future. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article set out to explore the linkages between two leading paradigms in environmental management, 
IWRM and AC. Previous research has conceptualised their relationship as being either mutually inclusive, 
defined by tensions, tense but reconcilable - or suggest breaking those paradigms down into their constituting 
elements. This research followed the latter approach. 
 
On the basis of a case study on participation in UK water and flood management, I find the link between IWRM 
and AC to be spurious. The empirical data suggests that active involvement in WFD water planning may indeed 
have been conducive to the creation of respective institutions in flood management. In terms of processes, 
however, there was little interaction, not the least because involvement took place at different scales and 
involved other groups of people. It is too early to assess linkages from a policy effectiveness and efficiency 
perspective. Yet my argument is not that the hypotheses proposed by Gain et al. (2013) are misleading per se. I 
instead argue that they oversimplify a complex reality and would benefit from revision along three lines. Current 
frameworks need, first, to take into account the conceptual diversity present in scholarly debates on IWRM and 
AC; second, to consider the temporal dimension more systematically; and, third, to think harder about their 
definition of the dependent variable.  
 
Future research may inform the debate in at least three ways: by creating a more sophisticated conceptual 
framework; by integrating literatures that have already theorised the interaction between potentially competing 
discourses, including scholarship on policy learning (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004), transfer and diffusion 
(Benson and Jordan 2011); and, finally, by developing research designs that include the comparative study of 
several cases. 
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